

## Message Text

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LIMDIS FOR BOSWORTH

E.O. 11652: GDS

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SUBJECT: DRAFT DISCUSSION PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY  
ISSUES FOR EPG MEETING MAY 19

REF: RAICHT/BOSWORTH TELCON MAY 11

1. THERE FOLLOWS A FIRST CUT AT A PAPER DESIGNED TO  
STIMULATE DISCUSSION ON A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL ENERGY  
POLICY ISSUES AT A MEETING OF THE EPG NOW SCHEDULED FOR  
MAY 19. WE ARE CIRCULATING THIS PAPER FOR INTER-AGENCY  
COMMENT AND INTEND TO HAVE A REVISED FINAL VERSION BY  
COB FRIDAY MAY 13.

2. BEGIN TEXT: INTRODUCTION. RAPID AND MASSIVE CHANGES  
HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET SINCE  
1970. REDUCED DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND, AFTER A BRIEF  
PAUSE, INCREASED DEMAND FOR IMPORTED OIL HAVE MADE SECURITY  
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OF SUPPLY A MATTER OF MAJOR NATIONAL CONCERN. WE HAVE ALSO  
SEEN DEMONSTRATED OUR VULNERABILITY TO ARBITRARY PRICE  
INCREASES.

IN THIS SITUATION WE HAVE DEVELOPED A THREE PRONGED  
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY VIS-A-VIS OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED  
COUNTRIES, THE PRODUCERS AND COUNTRIES IN THE DEVELOPING  
WORLD. WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN POLICY INITIATIVES CONCURRENTLY

IN EACH OF THESE AREAS WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT SUCCESS

WOULD ULTIMATELY DEPEND UPON A FOURTH ELEMENT OF U.S. POLICY--A STRONG DOMESTIC ENERGY PROGRAM SUCH AS THAT PUT FORWARD BY THE PRESIDENT ON APRIL 20.

UNDERLYING CURRENT POLICY ARE THE FOLLOWING BASIC ASSUMPTIONS:

-- THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED OIL TO MANAGEABLE LEVELS RATHER THAN COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE FROM FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY.

-- THAT THE U.S. CANNOT SOLVE ENERGY PROBLEMS ALONE, THAT WE SHARE COMMON ENERGY PROBLEMS PARTICULARLY WITH OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND THAT THE EFFECT OF U.S. EFFORTS CAN BE REINFORCED THROUGH COOPERATION WITH THESE COUNTRIES.

-- THAT SUCH A COOPERATIVE APPROACH IS ALSO VALID IN REDUCING THE THREAT OF EMBARGO.

-- THAT WE BUILD A LESS CONFRONTATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PRODUCER GOVERNMENTS AND INCREASE THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM.

INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES.

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THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA) IS THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS FOR MULTILATERAL ENERGY COOPERATION AND ENERGY POLICY COORDINATION FOR THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. IT HAS BEEN MORE ACTION-ORIENTED THAN MOST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. WE NEED TO CONSIDER ITS FUTURE ROLE AND HOW IT CAN BEST BE USED TO FURTHER U.S. OBJECTIVES. COOPERATION IS COMPLICATED BY THE ABSENCE OF FRANCE FROM THE IEA BUT THIS HAS BEEN PARTIALLY ALLEVIATED BY EC PARTICIPATION AS AN OBSERVER ON POLICY ISSUES AND DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN SOME IEA ACTIVITIES, E.G., R&D PROJECTS.

THE IEA EMERGENCY PROGRAM INVOLVING INTERLOCKING COMMITMENTS TO HOLD STOCKS AGAINST OIL IMPORT REQUIREMENTS, STANDBY DEMAND RESTRAINT MEASURES AND EQUITABLE ALLOCATION OF AVAILABLE OIL IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS IS NOW ESSENTIALLY IN PLACE. THE U.S. IS SUPPLEMENTING ITS IEA COMMITMENTS BY CREATING A STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE THAT WILL FURTHER REDUCE OUR OWN VULNERABILITY TO EMBARGO.

THE IEA HAS AGREED TO INCREASE THE STOCKPILE REQUIREMENT TO 90 DAYS OF IMPORTS BY 1980. FOR MOST IEA COUNTRIES,

WHO FACE GREATER IMPORT DEPENDENCE THAN THE U.S., THE COSTS OF ACHIEVING THIS LEVEL WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL.

IN THE AREA OF LONG TERM COOPERATION, THE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED U.S. DOMESTIC ENERGY PLAN WILL ENABLE US TO LEVERAGE OTHER INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES IN DIRECTIONS WE DESIRE.

REDUCED DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED OIL.

THIS IS THE FOCUS OF OUR CURRENT EFFORT IN THE IEA. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO OBTAIN COMMITMENTS FROM ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES TO A SHARE OF AN OVERALL REDUCED DEPENDENCE TARGET. THE NEW U.S. PLAN TO REDUCE IMPORTS TO 6 MMBD

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WOULD REPRESENT THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION. IT ALSO UNDERSCORES U.S. LEADERSHIP IN THE IEA AND PROVIDES THE POLITICAL IMPETUS TO OTHER IEA COUNTRIES TO SET AND MEET THEIR OWN NATIONAL GOALS.

COAL.

A KEY ELEMENT OF THE EFFORT TO REDUCE OIL IMPORT DEPENDENCE IS INCREASED USE OF COAL AS THE MOST READILY AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE. FEW OF OUR IEA PARTNERS HAVE LARGE RESERVES OF COAL TO BE EXPLOITED. THERE IS GREAT INTEREST IN U.S. PLANS TO INCREASE COAL PRODUCTION TO OVER 1 BILLION TONS BY 1985. THIS IS SEEN BOTH AS A MEANS OF REDUCING PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. ON THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET AND AS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF COAL IMPORTS TO REPLACE EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE OIL IMPORTS BUT THE ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF SUBSTITUTION WILL HAVE TO BE DEMONSTRATED (WE ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF DOING SO), AND NATIONAL CONSTRAINTS TO COAL IMPORTS WILL HAVE TO BE REMOVED.

THE NEW U.S. COAL PROGRAM WILL STIMULATE OTHER IEA COUNTRIES TO CONVERT FROM OIL TO COAL FIRED POWER PLANTS AND FOR USE IN INDUSTRY BUT ONLY IF LINKED, OVER TIME, TO INCREASING AND SECURE EXPORT FLOWS FROM SUPPLIER COUNTRIES. THE U.S. MUST CONSIDER WHETHER IT CAN INCREASE COAL PRODUCTION SUFFICIENTLY TO MEET BOTH EXPANDED DOMESTIC USE AND HIGHER EXPORT DEMAND. IN THIS CONTEXT CAN WE UNDERTAKE EXPORT GUARANTEES OR CONSIDER OFFTAKE GUARANTEES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. COAL PRODUCTION?

NUCLEAR

THE RECENT U.S. ANNOUNCEMENTS ON NUCLEAR POLICY HAVE AROUSED CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION IN EUROPE AND JAPAN. ONE

ISSUE WHICH HAS ALREADY SURFACED IN THE IEA IS THE MOST

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APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR THE AGENCY ON THIS ASPECT OF ENERGY POLICY. (THIS ISSUE WILL BE DISCUSSED IN THE IEA AT THE END OF JUNE.) RECOGNIZING THAT FOR MANY OTHER IEA COUNTRIES NUCLEAR POWER PLAYS A MAJOR PART IN THEIR GENERAL ENERGY STRATEGY, WE NEED TO DECIDE HOW NUCLEAR ISSUES INTERACT WITH OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES AND DEFINE AN IEA ROLE IN THIS AREA.

R&D COOPERATION.

THE IEA HAS ITS OWN PROGRAM OF ENERGY R&D COOPERATION THIS PROGRAM MUST COMPETE FOR LIMITED FUNDS WITH MORE TRADITIONAL, AND IN THE MINDS OF SOME, MORE SUCCESSFUL AND PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL PROGRAMS. ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ARE: SHOULD THE U.S. PRESS FOR GREATER EMPHASIS ON MULTILATERALIZED R&D? TO WHAT EXTENT CAN R&D CONTRIBUTE TO OUR EFFORTS TO FIND ALTERNATIVES FOR OIL IN THE MEDIUM TERM, AND HOW CAN WE REINFORCE SUCH PROGRAMS?

IEA MINISTERIAL.

EACH OF THE ABOVE AREAS IS IMPORTANT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN IEA MINISTERIAL MEETING NOW SCHEDULED FOR LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER. AT THAT MEETING IEA MEMBER COUNTRIES WILL:

-- ADOPT A GENERAL ENERGY POLICY FRAMEWORK TO REDUCE OIL IMPORT DEPENDENCE;

-- FORMALLY ESTABLISH AN OVERALL TARGET FOR REDUCED IMPORTS OF IEA MEMBERS BELOW WHAT THEY OTHERWISE WOULD BE IN 1985 (NOW AGREED AT 26 MILLION B/D);

-- UNDERTAKE A POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE NATIONAL MEASURES REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE TARGET;

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-- AGREE TO ANNUAL REVIEWS OF NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAMS USING THE FIRST THREE ELEMENTS.

WITH A STRONG U.S. DOMESTIC PROGRAM AS A BACKDROP THE MINISTERIAL SHOULD:

-- DEMONSTRATE THAT U.S. WILL COMBINE ITS LEADERSHIP WITH EFFECTIVE MEASURES AT HOME;

-- PROVIDE US WITH AN EFFECTIVE LEVER TO OBTAIN MATCHING EFFORTS FROM OTHER MEMBERS;

-- MAKE CLEAR TO OPEC U.S. AND OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY DETERMINATION TO REDUCE VULNEABILITY TO SUPPLY INTERRUPTIONS AND ARBITRARY PRICE INCREASES;

-- ENSURE THAT OVER THE LONGER TERM NECESSARY ACTION WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO SHIFT THE GLOBAL ENERGY BALANCE.

THE PRODUCING GOVERNMENTS.

OUR POLICY TOWARD THE PRINCIPAL OIL PRODUCING GOVERNMENTS HAS INVOLVED:

-- TRYING TO DRAW THEM INCREASINGLY INTO THE WESTERN TRADING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND INCREASING THEIR PERCEPTION OF THEIR OWN STAKE IN OUR ECONOMIC WELL-BEING; AND

-- IMPRESSING ON THEM THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE OF OIL PRICE INCREASES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY.

THIS POLICY, UNDERTAKEN BILATERALLY AND IN COORDINATION WITH THE REST OF THE IEA, HAS CONTRIBUTED TO SOME INCREASE IN THE APPRECIATION OF KEY PRODUCER GOVERNMENTS

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OF THEIR NEW RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND SOME MODERATION IN THEIR PRICING DECISIONS (PARTICULARLY BY SAUDI ARABIA, ALTHOUGH THEIR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES ALSO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THEIR POLICY.)

WE NEED TO CONSIDER MORE GENERALLY THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WE WANT WITH THE KEY PRODUCERS (SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, VENEZUELA, NIGERIA, POTENTIALLY MEXICO FOR THE U.S.) ARE WE ENTERING A PERIOD IN WHICH QUESTIONS OF SECURE SUPPLY WILL MORE CLEARLY OUTWEIGH QUESTIONS OF PRICE? ARE WE MORE LIKELY TO PERSUADE PRODUCERS WITH POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY TO EXPAND PRODUCTION WITH OUR PRESENT NON-CONFRONTATIONAL POLICY OR ARE THERE BENEFITS VIS-A-VIS MAJOR PRODUCERS FROM A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE? HOW FAR SHOULD WE GO IN CONTRIBUTING TO DEVELOPMENT OF NEW PRODUCTIVE AREAS?

SAUDI ARABIA REMAINS THE PIVOTAL MEMBER OF OPEC AND HAS PURSUED A POLICY OF RELATIVE MODERATION ON PRICES.

THE U.S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE SAUDIS TO KEEP WORKING FOR RESTRAINT IN OIL PRICES AND TO INCREASE PRODUCTION TO

MEET WORLD DEMAND. THE NEW U.S. DOMESTIC ENERGY PROGRAM SHOULD SIGNAL TO THEM THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO OUR SHARE BOTH TO CONSERVE ENERGY SUPPLIES AND TO REDUCE THE OVERALL DEMAND FOR SAUDI PRODUCTION IN THE 1980'S. ARE

THERE OTHER WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN SUPPORT SAUDI MODERATION  
WITHIN OPEC?

IN CIEC THE SAUDI DELEGATION HAS LINKED WILLINGNESS TO  
CONTINUE TO PRODUCE MORE OIL THAN THAT REQUIRED TO  
MEET THEIR OWN FINANCIAL NEEDS TO DEMANDS FOR PROTECTION  
OF THESE SURPLUS ASSETS. THE SAUDIS WANT ASSURANCES FROM  
THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES THAT IF THEY ARE TO GO ON  
PRODUCING MORE OIL AND GENERATING ADDITIONAL SURPLUS  
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REVENUES THAT THESE ASSETS WILL BE WORTH MORE IN THE  
FUTURE THAN WHAT THE OIL WOULD HAVE BEEN WORTH IF LEFT  
IN THE GROUND.

THE U.S. HAS NOT CONCEDED THAT SPECIAL TREATMENT IS  
APPROPRIATE FOR SAUDI ASSETS. WE, AND OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED  
COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT, ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL  
GROUNDS TO CONSIDER SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR SAUDI ASSETS.  
WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE HOWEVER THAT AS WE INCREASINGLY  
TURN TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR MARGINAL SUPPLIES WE MAY NEED  
TO REASSESS OUR CURRENT OPPOSITION TO SOME TYPE OF  
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF THE SURPLUS FINANCIAL ASSETS  
OF SAUDI ARABIA IF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS REVEAL A FIRM  
INTENT ON THEIR SIDE TO LINK FUTURE PRODUCTION LEVELS  
TO SUCH TREATMENT. EVEN WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS OF THE  
PRESIDENT'S ENERGY PROGRAM, SAUDI ARABIA WILL NEED TO  
PRODUCE WELL ABOVE ITS PREFERRED LEVEL IN THE 1980'S  
TO MEET WORLD DEMAND.

THE DOHA SPLIT PRICE DECISION REPRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO  
OPEC ALTHOUGH THE VIABILITY OF THE CARTEL DOES NOT  
APPEAR TO BE MATERIALLY THREATENED. OUR OWN INTERESTS  
WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY SAUDI ARABIA MAKING A CONVINCING  
DEMONSTRATION TO OTHER OPEC MEMBERS OF ITS ABILITY TO  
IMPOSE ITS WILL IN PRICES ON THE OTHER CARTEL MEMBERS.  
HOWEVER, THIS WILL REQUIRE A CONTINUATION OF PRESENT  
SAUDI POLICY BEYOND MID YEAR AND THE OPEC STOCKHOLM  
MEETING SCHEDULED FOR EARLY JULY.

A SHORT TERM ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE DECIDED PROMPTLY  
INVOLVES THE STRATEGY WE TAKE TOWARD THE JULY OPEC  
MEETING. IN ADDITION TO CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE SAUDI  
POSITION OF MODERATION, WE NEED TO CONSIDER WHETHER  
WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE A STRONG EFFORT, PARTICULARLY WITH  
IRAN, FOR THE 11 OPEC COUNTRIES TO FOREGO THE FURTHER  
5 PERCENT OIL PRICE INCREASE DECIDED AT DOHA. THERE ARE  
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INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE 11 ON THIS ISSUE, AND WE

MUST CONSIDER THE CIEC PROCESS AND OUTCOME BEFORE  
MAKING A DECISION.

LDCS.

OUR CIEC STRATEGY GIVES CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO MEETING  
THE ENERGY NEEDS OF THE NON-OIL LDCS AND REDUCING THE  
FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THEIR OIL IMPORTS ON DEVELOPMENT.  
THE EPG HAS ALREADY CONSIDERED THIS ISSUE AND AGREED  
THAT WE SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN AN INCREASE IN THE  
FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE IBRD LINKED  
WITH IBRD'S INCREASED EMPHASIS ON ENERGY IN LDCS. WE  
ANTICIPATE THAT SUCH LENDING WOULD FOCUS ON COAL AND  
PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT, IN VIEW OF THE HIGH RISKS INVOLVED  
IN EXPLORATION. ADVANCE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE WORLD  
BANK WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT STAGE IS LIKELY  
TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT, WHERE THE BULK OF THE  
CAPITAL WILL COME FROM, IN THE EXPLORATION PHASE. IF  
AGREED IN THE CIEC CONTEXT, THIS SHOULD HELP REDUCE LDC  
ENERGY CONCERNs. ARE THERE OTHER INITIATIVES VIS-A-VIS  
LDC ENERGY PROBLEMS WE SHOULD CONSIDER?

MEXICO.

A SPECIAL SITUATION IS DEVELOPING WITH RESPECT TO MEXICO,  
WHERE SUBSTANTIAL OIL RESERVES EXIST--AT LEAST 60 MILLION  
BARRELS OF ULTIMATELY RECOVERABLE OIL. MEXICO  
NATIONALIZED ITS OIL INDUSTRY IN 1938, AND FOR POLITICAL  
REASONS HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO INVITE FOREIGN FIRMS BACK  
ON EITHER A CONCESSIONAL OR PRODUCTION-SHARING BASIS.

PEMEX, THE STATE OIL COMPANY, WILL NEED TO BORROW BILLIONS  
OF DOLLARS INTERNATIONALLY IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS TO MOVE  
OIL DEVELOPMENT INTO HIGH GEAR. HOWEVER, THE MEXICAN  
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ECONOMY HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY OVER-EXTENDED, AND MEXICO HAS  
LAUNCHED AN IMF-SUPPORTED STABILIZATION PROGRAM WHICH  
PLACES A CEILING ON NEW FOREIGN BORROWING OF \$3 BILLION  
FOR 1977.

MEXICO IS LIKELY TO ASK THE IMF IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO  
PERMIT SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE BORROWING CEILING IN ORDER  
TO ACCOMODATE THE PACE OF MEXICAN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT.  
SHOULD WE SUPPORT THIS CONDITIONAL ON AN ASSURANCE TO THE  
IMF THAT BORROWING BY PEMEX IS SPECIFICALLY ALLOCATED TO  
THE PETROLEUM SECTOR, AND PEMEX BORROWING DOES NOT  
DETRACT FROM PUBLIC EXPENDITURE DISCIPLINE IN OTHER  
SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY?

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INSTITUTE.

ANOTHER ELEMENT WHICH MIGHT EMERGE FROM CIEC IS THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INSTITUTE. THE IEI PROPOSAL RESPONDS TO THE NEED OF LDCS FOR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY ASSISTANCE. IT IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING LDC ENERGY STRATEGIES, PROVIDING TRAINING, FACILITATING CONTACT AND COOPERATION BETWEEN LDCS AND PRIVATE COMPANIES ON EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AND STIMULATING THE MODIFICATION OF EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES TO MEET SPECIAL LDC NEEDS. WE ENVISAGE THE IEI AS A LEAN ORGANIZATION WITH LIMITED FUNCTIONS, AT LEAST INITIALLY. NON-OPEC MEMBERS OF THE G-19 FAVOR THE PROPOSAL, BUT OPEC MEMBERS DO NOT.

WHILE THIS GOES SOME WAY TO MEETING LDC ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CONCERNs, IT DOES NOT MEET THOSE OF THE MORE ADVANCED LDCS, E.G., BRAZIL, INDIA, ETC. THE IEA RECENTLY AGREED THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES SHOULD OFFER IN CIEC TO OPEN IEA R&D COOPERATION TO LDCS ON A PAY-AS-YOU-GO BASIS. THIS WILL APPEAL TO OPEC COUNTRIES CONCERNED ABOUT ACCESS TO POST-OIL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY

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AND CERTAIN ADVANCED LDCS. CHRISTOPHER

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